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The Impact of Corporate Governance on Value Creation in Entrepreneurial Firms 
Wee Liang Tan & Teck Meng Tan 
Singapore Mangement University 
Introduction 
The compliance with codes of corporate governance has become the norm for 
listed firms all over the world. In most countries, Entrepreneurial firms do not have to 
comply with such codes but it has been argued that such codes should also apply to these 
small medium enterprises (SMEs). Since corporate governance forms the environment 
for the internal activities of a company and appropriate environmental conditions are 
crucial for corporate entrepreneurship to flourish in a company, it is apt that these two 
topics be discussed in relation with each other. Corporate governance mechanisms may 
dampen value creation in firms if appropriate measures are mandated by the regulators. 
This paper examines the implications of the extension of corporate governance principles 
to SMEs and the impact this will have on value creation through corporate 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Recent Corporate Governance developments in Singapore 
The corporate governance movement in Singapore was triggered by the Asian 
Financial Crisis (1997-1998) in which the Singapore suffered significantly with regards 
to its previous growth patterns (Mak and Phan, 1999). The cause of the financial crisis is 
often attributed to poor corporate governance. (Stiglitz, 1998; Harvey and Ropez, 1999); 
Greenspan, 1999). Following the crisis, several initiatives were undertaken by the 
Singapore Government to strengthen its financial sector and also to enhance the 
competitiveness of its economy. In most measures of corporate governance, Singapore’s 
practices exceed its Asian neighbours. However, looking at the FDI confidence index1, its 
standards of competitiveness and efficiency are still not on par with world standards of 
corporate governance. A Corporate Finance Committee, responsible for improving the 
efficiency of the corporate fund-raising process and corporate disclosure, was formed in 
December 1997. A steady move from a merit-based regime to a disclosure-based regime 
is seen following the recommendations of the Corporate Finance Committee. This move 
also changes the role of regulators and requires fundamental changes to the legal and 
regulatory framework, accounting and auditing standards, codes of best practices and the 
role of third-party watch-dogs. (Mak and Chng, 2000). 
 
A review of the corporate regulation and governance was led by the Ministry of 
Finance, Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Attorney General’s Chambers in reply 
to the changes.  Three private sector-led committees were formed in 1999 to execute a 
review of corporate governance issues in Singapore. They are the Corporate Governance 
Committee (CGC), Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee (DASC) and 
Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (CLRFC). The CGC is 
responsible for evaluating international corporate governance best practice standards 
                                                 
1
 The FDI Confidence Index survey tracks the impact of likely political, economic and regulatory changes 
on the foreign direct investment (FDI) intentions and preferences of the world’s largest corporation 
against current practices among publicly listed Singapore companies, promote best 
boardroom practices, and improve director training. CGC submitted. 
 
Shortly after CGC’s report of its review and Code of Corporate Governance was 
submitted, the Code of Corporate Governance based on CGC’s recommendations was 
accepted by the Singapore Government in April 2001. By centering around 4 key areas of 
board membership, director and executive remuneration, accountability and audit, and 
communication with shareholders, the Code aims to encourage Singapore-listed 
companies to improve shareholder value through good corporate governance. It is 
compulsory for all listed companies to include a complete description of their corporate 
governance practices with reference to Code provisions in their annual report and to 
provide adequate explanations when deviations occur. 
 
In March 2002, MAS announced that it is compulsory for banks to rotate their 
external audit firms every five years. Audit committees comprising of non-executive 
members of which majority have to be independent was also mandatory for banks. All 
these changes have to be implemented by 2006. In the August 2002, the Council on 
Corporate Disclosure and Governance was formed to prescribe financial reporting 
standards for companies, to strengthen the framework on disclosure practices and 
reporting standards and also to revise the Code periodically in compliance with 
international best practices. 
 
 
Applying Corporate Governance to Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
SME Sector 
Companies are considered SMEs if they have at least 30% local equity, fixed 
productive assets not exceeding $15 million and an employment size that does not exceed 
200 workers for non-manufacturing sectors. According to figures released by Singapore 
Department of Statistics, the total number of SMEs in Singapore is about 105,000. 
 
The importance of SMEs in Singapore cannot be more emphasized. 90% of 
companies In Singapore are SMEs and they employ more than half of the workforce. 
However, the SMEs in Singapore only contribute 1/3 of total value added in the economy 
and this pales in comparison to the SMEs in Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is hence 
imperative that the capabilities of the SMEs be increased for the future of the Singapore 
economy. The Singapore Government realizes this and aim to groom SMEs into world 
class business entities. And to foster growth of a strong SME sector, the government 
developed initiatives on the organizational, directional and professional level. 
 
The nature of SMEs, family owned and managed, could impede the growth of 
SMEs. The SMEs tend to retain ownership and management of the business (Tan & Fock, 
2001). Professional management practices are also not introduced but this is changing 
with the presence of government initiatives to introduce new productivity practices.  
 
Corporate Governance and SMEs 
There has been a recent growing call for the application of corporate governance 
to SMEs.  The argument is that similar guidelines that apply to listed companies should 
also be applicable to SMEs. The application of corporate governance to SMEs is on the 
agenda of a group of experts meeting of the United Nations Commission for Europe to be 
held in early 2004 (UNECE, 2004).  
 
Corporate governance is largely associated with larger companies and the agency 
problem. The agency problem comes about when members of an organization have 
conflicts of interests and within a firm, the separation between ownership and control of 
firm is often cited. As such at first sight, corporate governance would not apply to SMEs 
since the agency issues are less likely to exist. Since SMEs only comprises of only the 
owner who is the sole proprietor and manager, SMEs fall under this category described 
by Hart (1995). The SMEs are likely to have a few employees who might be the kin of 
the owner. Since there is no separation between management and owner in SME, some 
argue there is no need for corporate governance guidelines. Further, SMEs are not 
accountable to the public since they have not accessed the investing public for funding 
leading to the questionable applicability of the disclosure and transparency often 
associated with corporate governance. 
 
Under absence of agency problems, profit maximization, increasing net market value and 
minimizing costs aims are the common aims of members of an organization. These 
members disregard outcomes of organization activities and are prepared all these aims. 
Since these members will be remunerated directly, incentives are not needed to motivate 
them. The absence of disagreements would also mean the absence of governance 
structures to resolve them.  
 
Positives of applying corporate governance 
On the other hand there are reasons SMEs, especially growing entrepreneurial firms, 
should adopt corporate governance practices. Growing entrepreneurial firms are defined 
as firms that have the growth orientation and intention to expand beyond state of survival. 
Corporate governance has similar benefits to SMEs as to listed forms. As entrepreneurial 
firms need access to resources for growth, the operations of resource dependence theory 
also apply to them. Inputs on business operations, good strategy and best practices in 
industry sectors would be needed. These could be provided for through the presence of 
external board members which is done same way as in listed firms. In research on listed 
corporations and corporate governance, it has been found that strategy influences 
corporate performance (McGahan & Porter, 1997) and that external board members 
challenge strategies proposed by the management (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). Hence if 
presence of external board members is welcomed, this could culminate to better 
management decisions. Also, non-executive directors could introduce creativity and 
innovation into the firm through the opinions and suggestions during decision-making. In 
a Japan Small Enterprise Agency, SMEs with very high growth rates use non-executive 
directors more actively than larger firms. 
 
When entrepreneurial firms grow, the need to introduce professional government 
practices and managers arises. By the introduction of professional managers, the 
separation between owner and management begins. Despite this development, Agency 
problems will exist between the non-family professional managers and owners. 
Incentives must be provided to professional managers in order to gain from their 
expertise. Next, for best performance from managers, governance of business units must 
be clear and distinct and accounting controls, internal audits will help to assess the 
performance of these managers. Despite modifications, agency argument from large firms 
still applies to SMEs. 
 
Using a stakeholder approach, a firm is not just responsible to its shareholder but also its 
constituency of stakeholders. These stakeholders include contractual partners, like 
employees, suppliers; social stakeholders like the members of the community; and the 
environment. This approach emphasizes long term performance enhancing contributions 
by stakeholders and also view corporations as socially responsible institutions. Thus, an 
appraisal of a firm will not only include financial performance but also employment, 
market share and growth in trading relations with suppliers and purchasers. Since 
corporate governance can protect the interest of stakeholders, it is suggested it be 
introduced to SMEs. 
 
Corporate governance allows firms to prepare for their pending initial public offering. 
The core values of transparency and accountability will be embedded in their corporate 
culture should corporate governance be applied early. This culture of transparency and 
accountability would also indicate professional management and good corporate 
governance is a key foundation for successful and well organized companies.  
 
Introduction of corporate governance will improve SMEs’ prospect of obtaining funding 
from banks, investors and venture capitalists. The presence of proper accounting and 
bookkeeping practices increase confidence in the firm and makes them less risky to 
invest or finance. Firms that have information disclosure tend to have healthier growth 
rates and ratios of ordinary profits to that of capital than firms who do not do so. Firms 
also will become increasingly committed to business efficiency due to the presence of 
external supervisory third-parties. 
 
Firms usually will only 3 to 4 years to prepare for their listing on the stock exchange. 
Currently, firms will only encounter corporate governance during this period and the 
learning curve is steep. The external absence of board members could mean that they do 
not gain experience. There firm might be hostile towards external board members as they 
might regard them as necessary procedures. 
 
Through the presence non-executive directors and effective audit systems, discipline is 
instilled in the management of SMEs. This is pertinent as the external parties ensure 
sound management as the management is aware of this external surveillance. 
  
Negatives of corporate governance 
The introduction of corporate governance would increase operational costs for 
SMEs. To fill additional roles in audit, remuneration and nomination committees, new 
and more directors have to be hired. The more active roles and heavier responsibilities 
that non executive directors have to undertake would also mean higher remuneration All 
this would translate to higher start-up costs and deter people from setting up their own 
businesses and dampen the entrepreneur culture. As many successful businesses 
worldwide started from small businesses, this outcome could prove undesirable. 
 
This, however, can be resolve by providing appropriate government subsidies. 
Granted that the government is interested in developing a resilient SME sector, the 
government would provide the necessary subsidies. Costs will then be reduced and more 
SMEs would be willing to introduce corporate governance practices. . 
 
Corporate Entrepreneurship  
One additional note of considerations necessary to the impact the implementation 
of corporate governance would have on value creation in entrepreneurial firms. The 
competitive edge of entrepreneurial lies in the creativity and innovation. It would be 
disastrous should corporate governance undermine value creation efforts, which in the 
instance of firms that have gone past the survival and development phases of growth 
would take the form of corporate entrepreneurship. Thus far our consideration of 
corporate governance has not considered the impact on internal operations of the 
entrepeneurial firms. At this juncture, we need to consider the implications of corporate 
governanceon value creation in these firms 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship refers to the efforts on the part of companies to foster 
entrepreneurs, innovation and new ventures in the corporate setting. Corporate 
entrepreneurship is important as a growth strategy and competitive advantage (Pinchot, 
1985; Zahra, 1991; Kuratko, 1993; Merrifield, 1993). It also contributes to organization 
renewal (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990) and profitability (Zahra, 1991). By harnessing 
innovation and effort of the members of corporation through corporate entrepreneurship, 
value creation is possible. A conducive environment would allow firms to tap into the 
innovative talents of their employees and managers. (Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 2002). 
Thus it is important the organization climate has elements that employees consider 
conducive. Corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship are seemingly different 
topics. Corporate governance, whether broad or wide, focuses on facilitating the profit 
maximization objective of firms. Profit motive and corporate governance mechanism 
would contradict efforts to encourage corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship can take various forms which Schollhammer (1982) 
has elucidated.  
 
Administrative entrepreneurship. By engaging in administrative entrepreneurship, 
the company is taking a step beyond having a traditional R&D department. A 
philosophy of corporate enthusiasm for supporting researchers exists. This is 
accompanied by the provision of extensive resources for making new ideas 
commercial realities. 
 
Opportunistic entrepreneurship. The company encourages champions to pursue 
opportunities for the company, and through external markets. 
 Acquisitive entrepreneurship. Corporate managers are allowed to seek new 
opportunities outside the company. This opportunities include mergers, 
acquisitions, new techonologies and strategic alliances. 
 
Imitative entrepreneurship. Japanese firms epitomize this form of 
entrepreneurship in their study and reverse engineering of others’ products. 
 
Incubative entrepreneurship. Semi-autonomous new venture development units 
are formed that provide seed capital, access to corporate resources, freedom of 
independent action and responsibility for implementation from venture concept to 
commercialization. 
 
 
How might Corporate Governanceimpact the internal operations of a firm 
particularly in its value creation activities 
To discuss the impact corporate governance has on value creation, close 
examination on the impact on its internal operations must be carried out. The four main 
aspects on the internal operations are strategic direction, financial expectations, 
transparency issues and shareholder activism. 
 
Strategic direction. Strategic direction is what determines the firm’s long term direction. 
Corporate governance requires the selection of presiding board of directors. If the board 
selection/nomination does not bring in the right thinking individuals then there would be 
less strategic long term initiatives that might affect the entrepreneurial direction of the 
firm since this usually implies less funding/attention being paid to innovation and R&D.  
 
Financial Expectations. With corporate governance requiring financial results and in 
some cases quarterly returns, this might cascade into shortened time horizons for research 
and development, innovation and other corporate entrepreneurial activities. Hence, if the 
focus is on the ROI [rate of return on investment] it could be detrimental to the selection, 
retention and termination of projects, venture teams and employee entrepreneurial 
initiative. As financial performance parameterized projects, certain worthy projects may 
be cast aside due to start-up costs. By applying the profit centre concept to units that are 
undertaking internal corporate ventures, these units may be shut in the short term due to 
the focus of corporate governance system on the continued profitability. Projects that do 
not give returns in shorter time frame may be rejected but these projects maybe the ones 
that generate greater value in the long run. There exists a paradox as these corporate 
entrepreneurship ventures will eventually generate profit.  The performance of managers 
is linked to projects that choose to undertake and managers would tend to pick projects 
that have more immediate results. This can prove to dampening on entrepreneurial 
projects. And if performance criteria are pegged to profit but rewards are not shared with 
employees, the motivation to initiate corporate entrepreneurship will be absent. This 
eventuality would result if the focus is on ROI and a shortened period of gestation is 
permitted to projects. The organizational culture could be affected by what occurs in the 
board room. 
 Transparency issues. corporate governancereform has also touched on disclosure and 
transparency issues. The guidelines issued might require the corporate disclosure of board 
activities. There is usually a requirement for an audit committee and internal audit. There 
is also a spate of management frauds which might tempt the regulators or advisory bodies 
responsible for corporate governance to institute guidelines or to peer into areas where 
abuse could occur. Unfortunately for value creation activities, the nexus between the 
activities, their intended results and the actual results might be tenuous or distant, leading 
any over zealous auditors to rein in value creation activities.  
 
Shareholder activism. One element of corporate governancereform has been to address 
the concern of one key group of stakeholders – the shareholders. However, shareholders 
who invest in the firms for the short term are less inclined to consider the longer 
perspective and there is room for arguing that the balance of the need to know how the 
corporation is performing and interfering with the firm’s activities. Taken to an extreme, 
shareholders could query the R&D expenditure or firm wide expenses on the 
development of organizational learning and corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
Designing Governance Systems 
A wider definition of corporate governance should be applied here and this wide 
view of corporate governance, called the stakeholder approach, encompasses the 
company and all interested parties. The system of governance could thus help or hinder 
internal corporate ventures. When designing governance systems, it should be kept in 
mind that instead of just ideal and clear cut systems which often correspond to corporate 
governance values of accountability, allowances must be made. These allowances include 
allowing loose groupings of staff across functions, innovation champions. By applying a 
broad view of corporate governance, corporate governance is not confined to the 
boardroom and this view allows us to take into considerations that will encourage 
corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
Conclusion 
The importance of corporate governance cannot be more emphasized as it forms 
the organizational climate for the internal activities of a company. If corporate 
governance is confined to broad governance, and beyond the board level and one that 
does not counter-demand innovation, research and development and corporate 
entrepreneurship strategies, it would have limited operational impact on SMEs. Since 
corporate governance brings new strategic outlook through external independent directors, 
it would enhance firm’s corporate entrepreneurship and competitiveness which is much 
desired. It is not a threat to value creation in entrepreneurial firms should the guidelines 
on corporate governance be applicable. 
 
 
 
Note: The authors are grateful to Leong Ying Ying Jeannette for her research assistance 
and to the SMU Enterprise Development Growth and Expansion program 
(http://research.smu.edu.sg/faculty/edge.html) for its support. 
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